HoneyWatchATTACKER PROFILING CONSOLE

HoneyWatch
AWS · AP-SOUTH-1
/
LIVE –
D
DilroseADMIN

Overview

Live Telemetry Global Attack Surface Analytics

Forensics

Payloads & Commands0 Session Explorer IOC Blocklist

System

Model Summary About
ml-profiler v1AP-SOUTH-1
aws/ap-south-1/cowrie-honeypotACTIVE

Live Telemetry & Ingress Traps COWRIE SSH

Real attacker traffic captured by the honeypot, classified by the ML pipeline, with automated blocking events overlaid on the timeline.

Attack Velocity — Last 48 Hours

click a red or yellow marker for details

Attacker Behavior Mix

share of all sessions

Recent Events

latest 200 classified sessions
Timestamp (UTC)Source IPBehaviorDurationLogins (try/ok)CmdsSession

High-Priority Sessions — Multi-Stage Attacker / Dropper

SessionSource IPDurationCmdsLoginsSeverity
telemetry/global-attack-surface

Global Attack Surface

Geographic origin of the most active attacker IPs (top 40 by session volume), resolved via IP geolocation and cached on the server.

Threat Origin Map

loading…
Marker size scales with session count. Red markers are IPs already blocked at the firewall; indigo markers are still active.

Top Threat Origins

share of mapped sessions
telemetry/analytics

Analytics

Behavioral breakdown, dwell time, login success and the defense posture across all captured sessions.

Attacker Behavior Breakdown

Top Attacker IPs

■ blocked  ■ active

Average Session Dwell Time

seconds, by behavior

Login Success Rate

% of sessions, by behavior

Defense Coverage

blocked vs. active attacker IPs

Command Timing — Bot vs. Human-Like Pacing

Under 1 s average gap between commands = scripted execution. Slower pacing suggests deliberate or more sophisticated behavior.

Hourly Intensity Heatmap

UTC · sessions per hour · last 48 h of data
lowpeak
forensics/payloads-commands

Payloads & Commands

What attackers actually ran inside the fake shell, the credentials they tried, and every session flagged as a multi-stage dropper.

Most Frequent Commands

top 12

Command Inventory

pattern-tagged
CommandCountPattern

Top Usernames Tried

credential harvest

Top Passwords Tried

credential harvest

Dropper Sessions

SessionSource IPDurationCmdsLoginsStatus
forensics/session-explorer

Session Explorer

Browse, filter and inspect individual classified sessions. Click any row for the full record.

Timestamp (UTC)Source IPBehaviorDurationLogins (try/ok)CmdsSession
forensics/ioc-blocklist

IOC Blocklist

IP addresses dropped at the firewall by the automated response layer, with the reason and trigger count.

Source IPReasonTrigger sessionsBlocked at (UTC)Age

Blocking Policy

enforced via iptables DROP
BehaviorTriggerEnforced by
DropperAny single command matching a payload-deployment patternLive log watcher (sub-second)
Cred-Stuff3 or more sessions from the same IPScheduled job (every 10 min)
Recon20 or more sessions from the same IPScheduled job (every 10 min)
Idle30 or more sessions from the same IPScheduled job (every 10 min)
Probe / ScannerNever blocked — one-off internet-wide scanners, kept for observation—
system/model-summary

Model Summary

Unsupervised clustering discovers attacker behavior groups; a supervised classifier then labels new sessions in real time. Retrained weekly on all accumulated data.

Pipeline

Cowrie honeypot→ Feature extraction→ K-Means clustering↔ DBSCAN cross-check→ Random Forest classifier→ Auto-classify (10 min)→ Automated blocking→ Weekly retrain

K-Means vs DBSCAN — Cross-Validation

Two algorithms with different assumptions (centroid-based vs. density-based) landing on a similar cluster count is evidence the behavior groups are real structure in the data, not an artifact of one method. DBSCAN is evaluated on a ≤4,000-session sample because the host has limited RAM.

Cluster Separation Quality

Cluster Size Distribution

sessions per behavior

Classifier Reliability by Cluster

held-out test split
ClusterPrecisionRecallF1Test supportReliability
Perfect scores are expected here because the classifier learns the clustering's own boundaries. Classes with very few test samples (e.g. the rare multi-stage cluster) are flagged because their metrics are not statistically reliable.

Automation Schedule

ComponentMechanismCadence
Cowrie honeypotsystemd service (auto-restart)continuous
Live dropper watchersystemd service, log tail + iptablesreal time (< 1 s)
Session classificationcron · Random Forestevery 10 min
Threshold-based IP blockingcron · iptablesevery 10 min (+2)
Full retrain (extract → cluster → classify)cronweekly · Sun 03:00 UTC
DashboardFlask behind Nginx + TLScontinuous
system/about

About

Honeypot Network with ML-Based Attacker Profiling

Project

A live SSH/Telnet honeypot (Cowrie) deployed on AWS captures genuine internet attack traffic. Unsupervised (K-Means, DBSCAN) and supervised (Random Forest) machine learning automatically profile attacker behavior from real session data, without relying on stale public datasets, and an automated response layer blocks hostile IPs at the firewall.

Team

Dilrose Singh (2301196)
Feroz Firdoos (2301198)
Supervisor: Dr. Ankita Gupta

Tech Stack

CowriePythonPandasscikit-learnFlask Chart.jsLeafletAWS EC2NginxLet's Encryptsystemdcroniptables

Ethics & Safety

The honeypot is isolated on a dedicated cloud instance and only observes parties that probe it. No captured payload is ever executed, and blocking only affects inbound traffic to this server.